ABSTRACT As external interfaces of vehicles multiply, information security of an automobile network system has become increasingly troubling. Mounting attacks have raised the attention of researchers to seek optimal solutions. Therefore, they set forth attack detection to demonstrate the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks, yet most of them focus on packet information directly. This paper comprehensively analyzes the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks and investigates a unique detection method based on clock drift of electronic control units. To investigate the applications of the proposed method further, we take attack time and attack density into consideration and present different patterns of two typical attack scenarios, i.e., injecting attack and suspension attack. In addition, we develop a prototype for data acquisition in a controller area network and undertake substantial vehicle experiments. The results show that the attack detection method has advantages in both recognition accuracy and application range compared with the method based on information entropy theory. This research work is expected to contribute to the further development of attacks detection system applied in vehicular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current automobiles are faced with serious security concerns since climbing electronic control units (ECUs) and wireless communication functions, e.g., infotainment, remote diagnostics and firmware updates, have been added into vehicular networks. These new functions may produce miscellaneous interfaces which are vulnerable to attackers [1] - [3] . In addition, the complex computer systems containing millions of lines of code in ECUs are vulnerable and challenging for poor security mechanisms [4] . Therefore, an increasingly number of demonstrations concerning about the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks have emerged.
Researchers have compromised ECUs distributed on board networks by means of physical access and remote attacks in recent years [5] , [6] . To deal with these vulnerabilities, various protection mechanisms and measures were proposed [7] - [9] . Some cryptographic techniques have also been proved excellent detection capability for some attacks [10] , [11] . However, the vulnerability of in-vehicle networks and limitations of on-board communication resources are the major bottleneck of security protection solutions. Requirement of comprehensive security defense methods has engendered growing attentions to intrusion detection for abnormal conditions or attack behaviors.
Some detection methods have been proposed in previous literatures. For example, Hoppe et al. [6] initially proposed the concept of intrusion detection for in-vehicle networks and analyzed four attack scenarios of controller area network (CAN) based on three selected intrusion patterns. Larson et al. [12] investigated ECU specification to detect attacks on in-vehicle networks by establishing normal behaviors of CANopen protocol. Muter and Asaj [13] performed entropy-based attack detection and evaluated this approach in three attack scenarios including increased frequency of periodic CAN messages, message flooding, and the plausibility of interrelated events. Murvay and Groza [14] proved the feasibility of source identification attack with signal characteristics in CAN bus. To improve attack detection accuracy, Song et al. [15] proposed a light-weight intrusion detection method that utilized time intervals of CAN messages.
Although these studies have scored accomplishments in abnormal behavior detection, the detection accuracy remains to be improved. In addition, the diversity of attacks scenarios needs to be explored and detected. Cho and Shin [16] thus fingerprinted ECUs by extracting clock skews from message timestamps to detect complex in-vehicle network attacks such as masquerades. In addition, Markovitz and Wool [17] classified CAN messages into different identified fields and developed a domain-aware anomaly detection system for unknown CAN bus traffic.
This paper underlines the effects of attack detection method based on clock drift of ECUs in typical attack scenarios. Specifically, CAN protocol in vehicular communication systems will be analyzed initially. As clock drift exists in devices [18] , we can obtain addition information about normal and abnormal behaviors of sending nodes in CAN bus. Based on the acquired information, we investigate the effect of an abrupt change detection algorithm, i.e., cumulative sum (CUSUM), for detecting identification error produced from the clock drift of ECUs. For pushing the application of the detection technology, substantial vehicle experiments have been undertaken further to explore various attack means for two typical attack scenarios: injecting attack and suspension attack. In order to illustrate the real detection performance, we choose two common attacks and evaluate the detection method compared with a typical information flow change detection method, i.e., information entropy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II delves into the vulnerability of the CAN network and abnormal detection principle based on clock drift of ECUs. Section III describes CUSUM algorithm and presents different patterns of two demonstration scenarios. Section IV evaluates performance of the investigated algorithm compared with the method based on information entropy. Section V underlines the advantages and limitations of the attack detection approach and concludes this article.
II. CAN NETWORK & CLOCK DRIFT OF ECUS
In-vehicle networks consist of four well-known sub-networks connected with each other by a gateway: CAN, local interconnected network (LIN), media oriented systems transport (MOST), and FlexRay [19] . CAN is an asynchronous serial network providing efficient and economical connections among ECUs through a multi-master mode and message broadcast mechanism. CAN network is most widely applied to automobile body systems, engine management, transmission, airbags, and so forth [20] . LIN is a low-cost multi-slave serial network complementing vehicular multiple networks and applied to components without special requirements for communication speed, such as automatic doorlock systems, safety belts, lighting systems, and windows. MOST is a highly aggregated bandwidth network for optical fiber and ring topology. It can be applied to the systems with the requirements for high communication speed such as infotainment systems, video navigation systems, and remote fault diagnosis systems. FlexRay supporting two-channel communication is faster and more expensive than CAN [21] . This network can be used for critical systems such as the powertrain and chassis. This paper aims to investigate the application of the attack detection approach in CAN network that is widely used in modern protocols.
A. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CAN NETWORKS
CAN packets are distributed to all nodes in the subnetwork. ECUs connected by the CAN network can share information about standard and extended identifier packets. Fig. 1 presents the frame of a standard CAN packet [5] , which can be divided into several sections such as identifier (ID), data length code (DLC), cyclic redundancy check (CRC), acknowledgement (ACK), and so forth. Data transmission in CAN bus requires confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication, yet all these are vulnerable to potential attacks.
1) CONFIDENTIALITY
In-vehicle CAN network connects nodes through a message broadcast bus. Each node broadcasts periodic data or sporadic frames on the CAN bus to provide retrieved data. The transmitted data are received by one or more nodes on the bus without certification or other security protection measures, thus leaving opportunities for attackers. For example, an attacker can eavesdrop or sniff the transmitted data on the bus, thereby disclosing node information. In other words, this vulnerability of CAN networks will give attackers chance to inject false messages to in-vehicle networks.
2) INTEGRITY
Because of the lack of identifiable tags for sending packets, it is difficult to determine whether the data are generated by nodes in vehicular networks or external devices. In effect, the packets received by nodes include critical information such as the fields of ID and ACK, providing the possibility for hackers to eavesdrop or tamper messages transmitted in CAN bus. Therefore, this vulnerability will damage the integrity of CAN network and undermine received nodes.
3) AVAILABILITY
In vehicular networks, every node can send messages at any time, which is the dominant working mode of CAN networks. However, conflicts will occur when one or more nodes have buffered data during transmission. To settle the conflict, an arbitration mechanism is proposed in CAN protocol [22] . In the actual transmission process, frame ID decides the order of packet transmission and affects receiver nodes. In this situation, low-priority packets would lose in arbitration and cannot be accessed by receiver nodes until the CAN bus is idle again. This arbitration mechanism based on priority of frames will lead to another vulnerability of the sub-network, assisting hackers in suspension attack. Additionally, denial of service (DoS) attacks may also be generated by some simple replay attacks or other injecting attacks.
4) AUTHENTICATION
During data transmission on the CAN bus, information for identification of ECUs is excluded in packets. It is the packet ID that can decide the CAN transceiver mechanism, and receiving nodes can operate packets only by ID rather than original address. Therefore, receiving nodes cannot tell whether received packets are sent internally or externally [23] . This may make it difficult to determine whether received packets are legitimate or not, failing to authenticate the transmitted data, thus allowing attackers to spoof a compromised node that cannot identify the correctness of received messages. Therefore, the vulnerability of authentication has attracted much attention by experts. Fortunately, there are some security mechanisms that can achieve high security levels for in-vehicle networks; e.g., Lin and Sangiovannivincentelli [9] proposed a security mechanism that can protect the CAN protocol from masquerade and replay attacks with low communication overheads.
B. CLOCK DRIFT OF ECUS
As is known, the time or network delay in devices and systems is a common occurrence for physical properties of electronic components [24] . Therefore, experts from different fields have investigated the principle and found that the offset change ratio will remain in a fixed value under certain conditions [25] . To be specific, the offset of two adjacent timestamps and measurement time of receivers may follow a linear relationship. As a specific device, ECUs in vehicles also have the characteristics of clock drift [18] . This linear relationship can be expressed as [16] : To explain clock drift of in-vehicle ECUs, this paper presents the relation diagram of timestamps of packets and the observed offset in different ECUs. Several lines with differing slopes in Fig. 2 indicate that there are varied ECUs sending messages of the CAN network in an electric car, BYD E5.
As is mentioned above, the parameter S represents the physical properties of varying devices. These physical properties can be used to detect abnormal behaviors of invehicle networks. In CAN networks, most packets send messages periodically, and correspondingly, receivers obtain these messages at a fixed time interval. Since offset exists in receiver timestamps for clock drift, physical properties can be extracted from timers of different ECUs and used as fingerprints to identify abnormal behaviors. For instance, in-vehicle networks will be considered under attack when the clock drift of ECUs change dramatically. In the following part, we will present an anomaly detection method for in-vehicle ECUs.
III. AN ATTACK DETECTION APPROACH BASED ON CLOCK DRIFT OF ECUS A. ANOMALY DETECTION
Considering every ECU has a fixed clock skew in vehicular networks, it is possible to establish a standard model of ECUs' clock behaviors to detect abnormal measurement value deviating from the stable value due to external attacks [16] . To verify the effectiveness of the method and explore the effects of attack behaviors, this paper selects two basic types of attacks-injecting attack and suspension attack.
We adopt CUSUM algorithm to detect the change of identification error based on accumulated deviations. This algorithm, which takes attack density into account for the first time, is designed to collect sample data and calculate small offsets and large mutations in data communication. Additionally, the detection algorithm has been proven to own the ability of detecting both low and high density of attacks.
The CUSUM algorithm, which is a change detection algorithm based on likelihood techniques, deals with independent and identically distributed random variables { y i } and probability p θ (y i ) [26] . In this paper, we present the two following hypotheses about the parameter θ:
where θ 0 represents θ before a change, and θ 1 after a change, and two distribution parameters are p θ 0 and p θ 1 respectively. This algorithm is based on the logarithm of likelihood ratio S n , which is defined as
where
Analyzing (2), (3) and (4), we can identify that the likelihood ratio S n holds a negative drift before a change and a positive one after a change. As is shown below, the alarm value g n is to be obtained by comparing the difference of likelihood ratio S n and its minimum value m n with the alarm threshold h.
where m n = min 1≤j≤n S j .
On account that identification error is caused by the difference between the measured value and the predicted value of clock offset, it can be considered as a random error and follows a normal distribution. Suppose { y i } is independent Gaussian random variables, µ is the mean and σ 2 the variance. Parameters µ and σ 2 are unknown as the change time of identification error cannot be determined before detection. In general, the mean and variance of identification error are a priori set using the maximum likelihood values of samples, but there is detection delay for the change detection algorithm [27] . To deal with this problem, this paper updates the mean and variance with the change of current identification error x i . Using (3), (4), and (5), we have
where CUSUM decision function g i ≥ 0 when i ≥ 2, µ i−1 , σ i−1 represent parameters before x i , and µ i , σ i after x i . Different variables measured and calculated in this paper are updated online and employed to detect the change of identification error of the timestamp during message transmission in vehicular networks. To improve the robustness of the detection algorithm, the parameter x i should react to the mean value before changes. This paper employs numerous sampling packets to obtain satisfactory detection results.
B. ATTACK SCENARIOS
In order to investigate the effects of the detection method based on clock drift of ECUs, this paper focuses on two common attack scenarios: injecting attack and suspension attack. To better evaluate the detection performance of the method based on clock drift of ECUs, we design two attack scenarios which take attack time and attack density into account.
1) INJECTING ATTACK
This attack is one of the most common scenarios that may occur in vehicular networks. For the vulnerability of CAN networks, attackers will sniff in-vehicle networks and perform injecting attack by replaying the sniffed messages or sending forged messages. The injecting messages will affect in-vehicle network traffic and received timestamp of packets in CAN network.
To investigate the influence of attack time and attack density, this paper focuses on single injecting attacks and periodic injecting attacks, respectively. Single injecting attacks send one message at a time, which is sufficient to cause critical security issues for a car. Periodic injecting attacks send fabricated messages periodically, and this type of attack is routinely used to test performance of detection methods.
2) SUSPENSION ATTACK
For the arbitration mechanism of CAN networks, attackers can block message transmission by certain attack methods such as flooding, DoS attack, and the intrusion behavior which will lead to network interruption. In this scenario, CAN network traffic will change, and this abnormal behavior can be recognized remarkably by intrusion detection methods.
In a real environment, hackers may sniff in-vehicle networks and send certain message to stop data transmission of the compromised ECUs. However, it is also possible to inject a great number of forged messages in short time to interrupt the communication of in-vehicle networks. Therefore, this paper considers two types of suspension attack: stop sending messages and DoS attack.
IV. EVALUATION OF ATTACK DETECTIONS A. ATTACK SIMULATION
This paper focuses on two typical attack scenarios: injecting attack and suspension attack. The first step is to simulate both two kinds of attacks. Therefore, the attack principle paths shall be taken into account in the implementation of two attack scenarios. This paper, thus, presents specific attack means to illustrate the authenticity and effectiveness of attack behaviors.
Two types of injecting attacks, i.e., single injecting attack and periodic injecting attack, are shown in Fig. 3 , where the horizontal axis denotes the transmission time of packets and the vertical presents the distinct packets in CAN networks. Compared with normal transmission cycle, the single injecting attack has three patterns, i.e., before half cycle, in the middle of cycle, and after half cycle, in Fig. 3 (a) . These three patterns represent different attack times for single injecting attacks. Periodic injecting attack can also be subdivided into three types by sending different frequency of messages as shown in Fig. 3 (b) . These injecting packets include three different frequency compared with normal sending frequency of messages, i.e., twice frequency, once frequency, and onehalf frequency.
The suspension scenario is presented in Fig. 4 , in which two types were performed to block message transmission. The first type is to stop message sending by preventing external devices from sending periodic packets, whereas the second type, i.e., DoS attack, is to inject numerous packets of replayed or forged messages into CAN network.
Similar to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 shows two forms of suspension attacks: stop sending messages and DoS attack. As shown in Fig. 4(a) , stop sending messages can be performed through compromised ECUs, leading to packets drops after the attack. Fig. 4 (b) presents two means of DoS attack by sending distinctive IDs of forged packets, for instance, the high priority IDs of injected packets can cause DoS attack for the low priority ones.
In this paper, we treat Vehicle Spy [28] , a network analyzer, as an external device or ECU to send different messages to realize different patterns of both two attack scenarios.
B. TEST PLATFORM
In Fig. 5 , a test platform connected to on-board diagnostic (OBD) was built to perform attacks and collect sending messages of CAN networks. The test platform consists of three parts: prototype used for collecting sending messages, Vehicle Spy for simulating two attack scenarios by sending different messages, and OBD connection for providing communication interfaces of message transmission between CAN network and the test platform.
As shown in Fig. 5 , the prototype includes three nodes, one is for messages storage, another for anomaly detection, and the third one treated as control ECUs to build suspension attack scenarios. These nodes consist of three Microchip STM32F103 CAN controllers and one liquid crystal display (LCD) for anomaly alarm. Vehicle Spy loaded on a laptop is regarded as one device to send messages to CAN network. It should be noted that this test platform is suitable for all types of cars with acceptability of messages monitored through OBD.
C. RESULTS
To demonstrate that clock drift of ECUs can be used as fingerprints to detect attacks and faults, we adopt a linear regression algorithm to acquire clock skew of every kind of messages as shown in Fig. 2 . As the high real-time requirement in attack detection, an adaptive and low computer overhead algorithm, i.e., recursive least squares (RLS), is adopted to update parameter values online [29] to verify the authenticity of attack detection.
In RLS algorithm, the update of the weight vector S[k], the error signal e[k], the Kalman gain vector G[k]
, and the inverse of the correlation matrix P[k] are described as following:
Through repeating iteration of (7)- (10), we can estimate the different clock skews and identification error online in different scenarios. Attack behaviors will be marked as data change in the test.
1) INJECTING ATTACK
In this scenario, the timestamps of messages transmitted in CAN network were tested. To illustrate the change of injecting attacks, typical behaviors during message transmission in CAN network were evaluated. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 reveal the change of known IDs and received timestamps of tested messages. The messages collected at ten minutes with three single injecting attacks are presented in Fig. 6 , and three groups of messages including three periodic injecting packets after three hundred seconds are shown in Fig. 7 .
During attack detection, the CUSUM algorithm is adopted to confirm whether in-vehicle networks are undermined by attackers. To evaluate the performance of the algorithm, substantial vehicle experiments without any attack were undertaken to analyze positive alarm.
In single injecting attack, there are three patterns caused by different attack time presented in Fig. 3 . These three attacks are expressed as before half cycle, in the middle of cycle, and after half cycle, respectively, and the forth curve in Fig. 6 represents normal behavior without attack. In Fig. 6(a) , the identification error of normal behavior swings around zero, whereas identification error of three kinds of single injecting attacks have the same change and the mutation happens after two hundred seconds. For better statistics for the mutation suspected in an attack, we use the CUSUM decision function value as abnormal alarm standard. As it can be seen in Fig. 6(b) , the single injecting attack that happened before the half cycle has the highest value in three attacks, whereas the single injecting attack after half cycle has the lowest value. In addition, there are remarkable gaps between normal behavior and three single injecting attacks, whereas small differences exist between these three types. The results show that attack time is not the decision factor for detection of single injecting messages but sufficient to identify the difference between normal behavior and single injecting attacks.
In periodic injecting attack, this paper mainly considers the effect of attack density and designs three patterns based on sending frequency, i.e., twice frequency, once frequency, and one-half frequency. In Fig. 7(a) , the first attack sending frequency twice has the highest identification error among three patterns and the mutation happens after three hundred seconds, whereas the other two patterns have close peak but slightly lower than the first one. However, there are vast difference in the CUSUM decision function value between the first attack and the other two as shown in Fig. 7 (b) . The results reveal that the CUSUM algorithm has sensitivity to attack density with good detection capability in this scenario. It can also be observed that periodic injecting attack is easier to detect than single injecting attack which can be detected with proper threshold.
2) SUSPENSION ATTACK
In this test, the timestamps of packets from compromised ECUs in a car are measured. The sole difference between suspension attack and injecting attack lies in their detection effects on forged packets. The analysis results are compared with typical behaviors of the performance of the algorithm. Fig. 8 presents the difference of recognition features between normal attack and three suspension attack, i.e., stop sending messages, DoS attack by replay, and DoS attack by spoof. As shown in Fig. 8 , we stop sending packets for twenty seconds by controlling ECUs to realize a suspension attack (the first attack), and inject ten thousand packets in one second to complete two types of DoS attack (the second attack and the third attack).
In Fig. 8 (a) , the first attack shows the similar changing trend for three attack patterns and the mutation happens after three hundred seconds. Compared with injecting attack, suspension attack shows more visible change of identification error over six thousand milliseconds. Furthermore, there are tremendous difference in CUSUM decision functions between normal behavior and three suspension attacks as shown in Fig. 8 (b) . This figure also shows a great difference between three patterns of suspension attacks.
In conclusion, suspension attacks can be detected as three abnormal behaviors changed dramatically over the time. It can be seen that the three suspension attacks share similar variation tendency. In fact, the high-density attack could lead to DoS, whereas the low density attack has lower value of recognition features. Thus, the change of detection value is related to the frequency of attacks, and higher attack density has more obvious characteristics of the detection method. Therefore, suspension attack has better detectability than injecting attack.
D. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
According to the result analysis presented above, it is clearly seen that the detection method based on clock drift of ECUs has excellent detection capability for various patterns of injecting attacks and suspension attacks. In order to perform evaluation, the detection method is compared with a typical light-weight detection method for in-vehicle networks, i.e., information entropy algorithm [30] - [32] . Due to the fact that both methods are sensitive to attack density, this paper chooses periodic injecting attack and DoS attack as detection scenarios.
1) INFORMATION ENTROPY
Information entropy, one of the most common algorithms, is not only widely applied to specify traffic variation, but also applicable to the traffic detection of in-vehicle networks. The change of traffic caused by attacks can be distinguished by relative entropy of packets. Based on the concept of relative entropy [12] , we can calculate the relative entropy RE(i) of periodically transmitted messages by
where p(i) and q(i) express normal behavior and attack behavior of probability distribution of packets in the ith step, respectively. Fig. 9 presents the change of relative entropy in two scenarios, i.e., periodic injecting attack and DoS attack. During the replay attack experiment undertaken in the test car, the message 0x508 is detected to be compromised by replay attack at the three hundredth second, whereas other messages only have a slight fluctuation as shown in Fig. 9 (a) . Additionally, the message 0x000 is forged for DoS attack to block the information transmission in BYD E5. The results reveal that the relative information entropy of all messages change abruptly after three hundred seconds due to the priority mechanism in CAN networks. Due to the fact that the detection algorithm based on information entropy is sensitive to traffic variation, the change of small-scale packets is difficult detected for the low value of relative entropy. For example, as shown in Fig. 9  (b) , the maximum value of relative entropy is 0.0128 in periodic injecting attack, yet 10.2646 in DoS attack. Therefore, information entropy detection method is also sensitive to attack density with good detection capability.
A detection threshold is set to distinguish normal behaviors from attacks. Note that the detection traffic depends on measured time and the value of relative entropy depends on the time interval set in experiment. Therefore, both detection threshold and time interval are indispensable for identifying the accuracy of this algorithm. This paper tests three patterns of periodic injecting attacks to calculate detection accuracy including true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR).
As shown in Table I , the accuracy of attack detection depends on transmission cycle, attack time, sampling time, and threshold value. To calculate the value of TPR and FPR of the relative entropy algorithm, this paper performs periodic injecting attacks to test the difference of changes. Since the researched algorithm is for attack detection, the value of FPR in the case of 100% TPR is our dominant concern. In addition, it can be seen that the lowest value of FPR is 7.4% in injecting attack of relative entropy algorithm.
The above case presents the difference in the detection of various attacks by this algorithm, which is weak in detection of small traffic change such as single injecting attack. Moreover, it can be concluded through analysis of detection principles that this detection algorithm has limitations in detection of false information injecting attack compared with replay attack.
2) COMPARISON RESULTS
To better evaluate the performance of the detection method based on clock drift of ECUs, this paper analyzes the CUSUM algorithm under the same conditions with the information entropy detection algorithm as presented above. However, the investigated detection algorithm needs to set initialization parameters, e.g., the number of samples and the threshold value. The data statistics of the injecting attack are shown in Table II , where FPR and TPR of the detection system are based on different numbers of sampling packets and threshold values. It should be noticed that FPR is acquired with 100% TPR to meet detection requirements. As is shown in Table II , the minimum FPR of the injecting attack is lower than that of relative information entropy, and three attack types share similar detection accuracy. The results also show that the CUSUM algorithm is affected by attack type, number of samples, and threshold value greatly.
Although information entropy can detect periodic injecting attack, the analysis result shown in Table I presents that this detection method needs at least one second sampling time with average 460 packets. The CUSUM algorithm demonstrates good detection performance only with 20-100 samples of packets. Therefore, CUSUM algorithm is sensitive to small changes of packets, allowing it to detect weak replay attacks and corresponding abnormal behaviors other than small-scale suspension attacks unrealizable for information entropy detection algorithm. Except for periodic injecting attack, CUSUM algorithm can also be applied to single injecting attack shown in Fig. 6 . In-vehicle network traffic change can also be detected distinctly with the CUSUM algorithm. In conclusion, the CUSUM algorithm based on clock drift of ECUs is superior in detection rate and application range.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Communication protocol is vulnerable to attackers, therefore, attack detection of in-vehicle networks is critical to vehicle security. This paper focuses on clock drift in ECUs to explore the effects of attack detection in CAN networks. CUSUM algorithm is used to detect attacks through the agency of characteristics of clock drift of in-vehicle ECUs. Applications of this attack method to injecting attack and suspension attack are also explored. The two types of attacks are subdivided according to attack characteristics to evaluate the performance of the detection method, which can be verified by comparing typical behaviors of information entropy detection algorithm. The results reveal that the detection algorithm is superior to information entropy algorithm in terms of FPR and application range. The analysis results demonstrate that the proposed detection method can detect small-scale change of packets transmitted in CAN networks. It can thus be concluded that this method is viable in terms of abnormal behavior detection that is barely realized by other methods.
However, there are still some pending problems concerning this method such as the stability of clock skews and relative affected factors. For example, clock skews of ECUs will vary over time, leading to a decrease in detection accuracy. In actual vehicle experiments, the operation of ECUs will raise chip temperature and change clock skews. Thus, this method should be improved in abnormal behavior detection. Due to the fact that this detection method is sensitive to abrupt changes of packet sending time, the integrity and fidelity of timestamps received are so critical that the detection system should be of good memory and processing capability. In addition, other factors such as interference of other electronic devices, vehicle restart and electric energy cycle should also be considered.
The CUSUM algorithm based on clock drift is certainly not perfect. Weak detection ability for forged messages is a case in point. The method should thus be optimized constantly to detect unknown messages, yet we should be aware that the false negative case is inevitable. Since this detection algorithm is sensitive to small-scale changes of in-vehicle networks, the false positive rate of this detection algorithm for the unstable data will be high. Another limitation is the difficulty in detecting aperiodic messages due to the fact that the fixed clock skews ECUs are hard to obtain in real cars.
In conclusion, the detection method based on clock drift of ECUs is not yet perfect and entails continuous optimization. 
